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 Abstract 
 The main argument of this review is that motivational development associated 
with normal aging affects decision making. With increasing age, the ratio of gains to 
losses becomes more and more unfavorable. Reflecting the increasing losses in resourc-
es, goal orientation changes from a predominant orientation towards gains in young 
adulthood to an increasingly stronger orientation towards the prevention of loss in old-
er adulthood. As goals serve as reference points for the evaluation of decision out-
comes, this change in goal orientation across adulthood might also affect decision mak-
ing. The decision-making literature has recognized that choices are influenced by goal 
orientation. However, little research has been conducted on how goals influence the 
decision-making process in general and with regard to aging in particular. To date, find-
ings on decision making and aging remain inconsistent and are in need of a develop-
mental framework. With regard to applications, a better understanding of the aging 
decision maker can provide insight into how to improve communication efforts about 
issues like advance care planning, medical treatment, and housing options. 
 Copyright © 2012 S. Karger AG, Basel 
 Older adults face important and complex decisions such as which health care 
provider to choose, which housing arrangements to make, or how to manage their 
financial resources. Understanding age-related changes in the decision process may 
help us to design decision contexts in a way that enables older adults to make optimal 
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decisions. Only little is known, however, on the effect of normal aging on decision 
making [Mata, Josef, Samenez-Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011; Mather, 2006; Sanfey & 
Hastie, 2000].
 One of the main propositions of lifespan psychology is that aging does not rep-
resent a uniform trajectory across different domains of functioning, but instead is 
multidirectional [Baltes, 1987]. In other words, normal aging comprises different 
developmental changes in different functional domains such as cognition, emotion, 
and motivation. For instance, whereas fluid intelligence declines across adulthood, 
crystallized intelligence is fairly stable well into old age [Li et al., 2004]. These age-
related cognitive changes have been shown to influence decision making in older 
adults [e.g., Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2010; Mata, 2007; Mata, Schooler, 
& Rieskamp, 2007; Peters & Bruine de Bruin, 2011]. Importantly, different kinds of 
decision-making tasks may draw more or less on fluid or crystallized aspects of cog-
nitive functioning such as information processing speed or working memory capac-
ity, on the one hand, or on experience in making choices and in dealing with gains 
and losses associated with their choices, on the other [Mata et al., 2011]. Thus, it is 
not surprising that there is empirical evidence supporting an age-related decrease as 
well as stability in decision-making competence [for reviews, see Bruine de Bruin et 
al., 2010; Yoon, Cole, & Lee, 2009].
 Going beyond cognitive functioning, some authors have drawn attention to the 
importance of socioemotional changes [e.g., Mather, 2006; McCarrey, Henry, & 
Luszcz, 2010]. In particular, there seems to be an age-related increase in people’s re-
liance on affective information, which may allow older adults to compensate for cog-
nitive decline in some decisions [Finucane, 2008; Hanoch, Wood, & Rice, 2007; Pe-
ters & Bruine de Bruin, 2011]. A meta-analysis on predecisional information search 
suggested that the aging decision maker tends to consider fewer pieces of informa-
tion when making decisions, but that this may lead to only minor losses in decision 
quality, reflecting an effective strategy [Mata & Nunes, 2010]. There is also an emerg-
ing literature on neuroeconomics and aging that covers neuropsychological changes 
in older adulthood and their impact on decision making [for reviews, see Brand & 
Markowitsch, 2010; Brown & Ridderinkhof 2009; Mohr, Li, & Heekeren, 2010]. In 
addition to age-related cognitive, neuropsychological, and socioemotional changes, 
we posit that  motivational changes regarding people’s orientation towards gains and 
losses also influence how they make decisions in different areas of their lives. It is 
interesting that age-related motivational changes in people’s goal orientation to-
wards gains or losses have largely been neglected in decision-making research. This 
is surprising as the motivational concept of goals plays a crucial role in the decision-
making process, particularly in the evaluation of choice options. For instance, Yates 
and Patalano [1999] stressed that the special nature of decision making lies in the 
subjective value of what is perceived as a satisfying outcome. The construal of what 
constitutes a satisfying outcome most likely depends on what the decision maker 
wants to achieve or avoid, respectively.
 As Hastie [2001, p. 656] put it: ‘Good decisions are those that effectively choose 
means that are available in the given circumstances to achieve the decision maker’s 
goals.’ According to this definition of a ‘good choice,’ the decision maker’s goals and 
the means at his or her disposal are essential in the decision-making process. Impor-
tantly, both goals and available means are subject to developmental change. Hence, 
we posit that age-related changes across adulthood in the predominant motivation 
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to achieve gains or avoid losses are related to age-related changes in decision making. 
Note that we do not advocate the notion of a general decline in decision-making ‘per-
formance’, with older adults making worse decisions than younger adults. Instead, 
we argue that, although adults of all ages want to achieve gains and avoid losses when 
making decisions, younger adults might be more motivated than older adults to base 
their decisions on the motivation to achieve gains. In contrast, older adults might be 
more motivated than younger adults to avoid losses when making decisions. 
 Two of the most striking changes that occur in normal aging are an increase in 
losses in various life domains (e.g., fluid intelligence, physical performance, health) 
and a decrease in gains [Baltes & Smith, 2003], leading to an overall decline in the 
availability of resources [Baltes, 1997]. How does the experience of this change in 
gains and losses and the availability of resources across adulthood affect how we 
make decisions? We posit that motivational changes related to the changing ratio of 
gains to losses across adulthood profoundly affect the process of decision making. 
More specifically, we propose that age-related changes in goal orientation from a 
predominant gain orientation to an increasing importance of the prevention of loss-
es across adulthood [Freund & Ebner, 2005] affect decision making in the following 
way: the goal of preventing losses might increase the salience of potential losses (rel-
ative to gains) when older adults make a decision. The corresponding ‘vigilant’ or 
conservative decision-making strategy aims at avoiding losses by reducing costly er-
rors and helping to evade threat [e.g., Crowe & Higgins, 1997]. Hence, the aging de-
cision maker may show a stronger sensitivity to losses and a weaker sensitivity to 
gains as compared to younger adults. Note that our perspective does not conflict 
with the idea that decision making in older adults might be affected by cognitive, 
neuropsychological, and socioemotional changes. Instead, we believe that motiva-
tional changes across adulthood and their potential impact on decision making have 
been largely overlooked in the literature. We posit that motivational changes in peo-
ple’s orientation towards gains and losses influence information processing and de-
cision strategies. Complementing research on older decision makers’ stronger reli-
ance on affective information [Finucane, 2008], we hypothesize that the motivation-
al orientation towards gains or losses may influence the  kind of affective information 
(gain- vs. loss-related information) older adults rely on more. 
 In sum, this review elaborates on how motivational changes in goal orientation 
associated with normal aging may affect the decision-making process. This paper 
is divided into six sections: (a) the dynamics of gains and losses in normal aging, 
(b) goal orientation across adulthood, (c) motivational factors in decision making, 
(d) gains and losses in decision making and aging, (e) key issues for future research, 
and (f) applied consequences. 
 The Dynamics of Gains and Losses in Normal Aging 
 Developmental gains and losses are present throughout the entire life span and 
involve internal as well as external resources (e.g., sensorimotor, cognitive, physical, 
and social resources) [Baltes, 1987, 1997]. With increasing age, adults increasingly 
face losses in resources due to declining health and cognitive functioning, retire-
ment, and the death of loved ones [e.g., Baltes & Smith, 2003]. There is high consen-
sus among adults of all ages regarding the expectation of predominating gains in 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
: 
Un
ive
rs
itä
t Z
ür
ich
,  
Ze
nt
ra
lb
ib
lio
th
ek
 Z
ür
ich
   
   
   
 
13
0.
60
.4
7.
22
 - 
6/
24
/2
01
6 
3:
08
:2
3 
PM
Human Development
2011;54:349–367
352  Depping/Freund
 
younger adulthood and an increasing number of losses in middle and late adulthood 
[Heckhausen, Dixon, & Baltes, 1989; Heckhausen & Krueger, 1993; Mustafic & 
Freund, 2011].
 According to Hobfoll’s [1998] conservation of resources theory, when people are 
faced with the threat of resource losses, preventing loss becomes more important 
than acquiring new resources [see also Freund & Riediger, 2001]. Accordingly, as 
people age and thereby increasingly encounter losses, their goal orientation should 
shift from growth (gains) in young adulthood to maintenance and prevention of loss 
in older adulthood [e.g., Ebner, Freund, & Baltes, 2006; Freund, 2006; Freund & Eb-
ner, 2005; Heckhausen, 1997; Staudinger, Marsiske, & Baltes, 1995]. Goal orientation 
is likely to influence decision making by influencing information processing as well 
as the evaluation of decision outcomes. Whereas younger adults may process deci-
sion-related information and evaluate decision outcomes primarily with respect to 
gain maximization, older adults may focus more on and favor information related to 
outcomes that ensure the avoidance of losses. 
 Goal Orientation across Adulthood 
 In the motivational literature, there is a fundamental distinction between ap-
proach and avoidance motivation [e.g., Emmons, 1996], which corresponds roughly 
to a distinction between goals that are oriented towards gains or growth and goals 
that are oriented towards the maintenance of functioning or the avoidance of loss 
[Freund & Ebner, 2005]. Similarly, the regulatory focus theory [Higgins, 1998] dis-
tinguishes between promotion and prevention focus where promotion focus de-
scribes the orientation towards approaching something desired and prevention focus 
the orientation towards avoiding something undesired. Regulatory focus is also re-
flected in strategies of goal pursuit as either eager (i.e., attempting not to leave out 
any possibility to promote gains) when adopting a promotion focus or as vigilant (i.e., 
attempting to avoid any risks and watching out for possible danger of losses) when 
adopting a prevention focus.
 Across adulthood, motivation shifts from a primary growth orientation (i.e., 
achieving gains) to an increasing importance of maintaining resources and prevent-
ing losses [Freund & Ebner, 2005]. Ebner et al. [2006] found that younger adults de-
scribed their personal goals as primarily oriented towards growth, whereas middle-
aged and older adults increasingly described their personal goals as being directed 
at maintenance and prevention of loss. Converging evidence is provided by self-re-
port studies of personal goals by Heckhausen [1997] and Ogilivie, Rose, and Heppen 
[2001]. Experimental studies suggest that this shift is due to the availability of re-
sources. Younger adults shifted from a gain to a loss orientation when their resourc-
es were perceived as restricted [Ebner et al., 2006].
 Is this shift in goal orientation adaptive? In the study by Ebner et al. [2006], loss 
orientation was negatively related to subjective well-being in young but not older 
adults, and maintenance orientation was even positively associated with subjective 
well-being in older adults. In younger adults, goal orientation towards the avoidance 
of losses was correlated negatively with subjective well-being. This speaks for an age-
differential adaptiveness of goal orientation across adulthood. Further attesting to 
this pattern, Freund [2006] found in a set of experiments that older adults were more 
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persistent in pursuing a task geared towards counteracting losses, whereas younger 
adults were more persistent when they pursued the same task geared towards achiev-
ing gains. We find it interesting that this age-related difference in persistence was 
unrelated to task performance. In other words, the driving force for persisting in goal 
pursuit was not how well younger or older adults performed on it but, instead, the 
framing of the task as gain or loss related. Taken together, these studies provide em-
pirical evidence supporting the notion of a shift in goal orientation from gains to 
losses across adulthood that is adaptive regarding behavioral indicators of motiva-
tion as well as subjective well-being. The consequences of this shift in goal orienta-
tion on decision making in normal aging will be discussed in greater detail after a 
review of studies on the impact of motivation on decision making.
 Motivational Factors in Decision Making 
 Economists usually view behavior as an attempt to maximize gains and mini-
mize losses or as the quest for pleasure and the escape from pain [e.g., Camerer, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005]. Although it has long been recognized that choices are 
influenced by goals [e.g., Heath, Larrick, & Wu, 1999; Higgins, 1998; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 
Yoon et al., 2009], the way in which goals influence choice has largely been neglected. 
For instance, the prospect theory proposes that the value (utility) of an outcome is 
the result of how far it deviates positively or negatively from a reference point [Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979]. Although it has been acknowledged that goals may serve as 
reference points in the evaluation of outcomes [Heath et al., 1999; Kahneman & Tver-
sky, 1979; Locke & Latham, 1990; Mento, Locke, & Klein, 1992; Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1981], most applications of the prospect theory have not taken individual goals 
into account. Instead, the status quo is assumed to serve as a reference point. Taking 
the notion of personal goals as setting comparison standards seriously, one might 
assume that goal orientation has an important impact on the evaluation of an out-
come, independent of the status quo. For instance, if the goal is to prevent a serious 
loss, a less severe loss might be experienced as a gain. Conversely, if the goal is to 
achieve a very high gain, a lower gain might be experienced as a loss. Similarly, Idson, 
Liberman, and Higgins [1999] argued that the difference in hedonic experience of 
gains and losses (i.e., as how rewarding or punishing an outcome is experienced) de-
pends on the person’s motivation to either promote gains or prevent losses. More 
specifically, they argued that the presence or absence of a gain (gain vs. non-gain) or 
a loss (loss vs. non-loss) is experienced differently depending on whether a promo-
tion or prevention focus was adopted. When trying to prevent a loss, not losing can 
feel like winning. A gain will usually be experienced as pleasurable, but may be ex-
perienced as even more pleasurable if it was not expected [e.g., Mellers, 2000]. In 
sum, the value of an outcome is subjective and depends not only on the status quo, 
but also on the decision maker’s goals and expectations. This, in turn, might influ-
ence the decision-making process. As argued by Mellers [2000] in her subjective ex-
pected pleasure theory, decision makers anticipate the pleasure and pain of outcomes 
and select choices with greater average pleasure.
 To date, most studies directly investigating the impact of goals on decision mak-
ing have only used samples of young adults. Some have argued that existing research 
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on how goals influence decisions under uncertainty 1 in young adults suggests that 
pursuing a goal increases risk taking. For instance, in one experiment participants 
cheated more when they wanted to reach a certain goal [Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & 
Douma, 2004]. In another study, participants accepted more risks to reach an actual 
monetary goal [Larrick, Heath, & Wu, 2009]. Note, that these studies investigated 
decision making in the context of gain-oriented goals. 
 Very few studies have investigated the differential effects of goals directed at 
growth or at the prevention of loss on decision-making strategies. In one of the few 
exceptions, Crowe and Higgins [1997] looked at the effect of an experimentally in-
duced prevention or promotion focus in young adults on the performance in a signal 
detection paradigm. In this task, participants had to press ‘yes’ or ‘no’ depending on 
whether a signal was presented or not. The authors found that young participants 
with an experimentally induced prevention focus had a bias towards pressing ‘no’ 
(i.e., adopting a vigilant strategy). Conversely, persons with an experimentally in-
duced promotion focus had a bias to press ‘yes’ (i.e., adopting an eager strategy). The 
authors argue that these biases reflect differences in the general decision strategies 
used when people hold a prevention or a promotion focus: according to Crowe and 
Higgins, prevention focus is associated with the tendency to be cautious in order to 
avoid mismatches to desired end states (vigilant strategy), whereas a promotion focus 
is related to jumping at opportunities that might help one to achieve desired end 
states (eager strategy). Further supporting the notion that a conservative or vigilant 
decision strategy is used when a prevention focus is adopted, Chernev [2004] found 
in a study on consumer preferences that young adults more strongly preferred the 
status quo over changing their selection of an object (here: a digital camera) when 
they had been primed to be prevention- as compared to promotion-focused. 
 Importantly in the current context, these studies demonstrate that people’s de-
cision strategies are related to their motivation to promote growth or prevent losses. 
Note that these studies were based on college-aged samples and, therefore, cannot 
address possible age-related effects. They can be used, albeit with caution, as a basis 
for speculating about decision-making differences between gain-oriented (promo-
tion-focused) younger adults and loss-prevention-oriented older adults. Motivation-
al changes in goal orientation might lead older adults to become more vigilant and 
conservative decision makers in order to avoid further losses and secure the mainte-
nance of resources. This might lead to an increasing asymmetry in the importance 
older adults place on losses compared to gains when making decisions, such that they 
become more sensitive to and react more strongly to losses than younger adults do. 
Consequently, older adults might attend more to information related to potential 
losses when making a decision, and to weigh such information more heavily than 
gain-related information. Increased motivation to avoid losses in older adults might 
also be associated with a preference for familiar options in order to minimize the 
chances of unpredictable losses. In repeated or rule-based decisions, an increase in 
loss orientation in older adults may result in a response bias to avoid costly errors 
rather than maximize possible gains (similar to those shown by Crowe and Higgins 
[1997] in younger, prevention-focused adults).
 1  In the decision-making literature, ‘uncertainty’ typically refers to situations in which outcomes 
are unknown and uncertain, whereas in risky situations uncertainty can be predicted by defined prob-
abilities [e.g., Bechara, 2004]. 
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 Note that there may be fundamental differences between older adults’ general 
goal orientation towards the prevention of losses and younger adults’ adoption of a 
prevention focus. For younger adults, having to prevent losses might constitute the 
exception to the rule of maximizing gains. As a consequence, they might react even 
more strongly to losses than older adults for whom losses are expected and more 
common. Moreover, for older adults, the prevention of a loss might actually be mo-
tivating and considered positive [Ebner et al., 2006; Freund, 2006]. In contrast, for 
younger adults having to prevent losses might be a stronger signal of something go-
ing wrong because losses are rather unexpected during this phase of the life span 
[Freund & Riediger, 2001].
 Gains and Losses in Decision Making and Aging 
 In the classic decision-making literature, gains and losses mostly refer to mon-
etary gains and losses in experimental decision-making tasks. Asymmetries in gain-
loss processing in decision making are well accepted: loss aversion, for example, has 
been called ‘the most successful and widely used explanatory construct in behav-
ioral decision research’ [Brenner, Rottenstreich, Sood, & Bilgin, 2007, p. 369; for 
critical perspectives on when loss aversion occurs, see Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & 
Erev, 2004; Yechiam & Ert, 2011]. Loss aversion denotes a higher impact of losses on 
a choice than do equivalent gains. The construct was initially formalized as a com-
ponent of the prospect theory, an analysis of risky choices to explain risk aversion in 
monetary decisions [Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992]. 2 Loss 
aversion was also used in the domain of riskless choice to explain effects such as the 
endowment effect [Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990] and other phenomena [see 
Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005]. According to the prospect theory, changes for the 
worse (losses) loom larger than equivalent changes for the better (gains) [Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991]. For example, when asked to accept or 
reject a 50: 50 bet to either win or lose a certain amount of money, participants usu-
ally accept when the potential gain is at least twice as high as the potential loss. This 
reflects a strong asymmetry of gains and losses in decision making. Despite the 
seeming ubiquity of loss aversion, the literature suggests that decisions from experi-
ence differ strongly from decisions from description [Hertwig et al., 2004]. More-
over, Yechiam and Ert [2011] found only moderate consistency within subjects across 
different tasks and between description-based problems presented in different do-
mains. We propose that loss aversion might also depend on the decision maker’s goal 
orientation. In the following, findings about  age-related changes in the asymmetry 
of gains and losses in decision making will be reviewed.
 On the basis of the motivation literature, we argued above that older adults 
might be more sensitive to and place greater importance on losses than younger 
adults during the decision-making process. Findings from the reinforcement learn-
ing literature are in line with this reasoning. Frank and Kong [2008] showed that age 
 2  Note that, within the framework of the prospect theory, risk does not denote uncertainty, but the 
precise probabilities of several specific alternatives such as the 10% probability of dying of unwanted 
side effects after receiving a vaccine that, on average, increases the probability of surviving a corre-
sponding infection to 80%.  
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had a significant effect on the bias to avoid negative outcomes. Older seniors (mean 
age = 77 years), but not younger seniors (mean age = 67 years), showed an increased 
tendency to learn from the negative as compared to positive consequences of their 
decisions in a probabilistic selection task. This finding supports the idea that older 
adults grow increasingly vigilant towards losses. Moreover, the difference between 
younger and older seniors shows that the tendency to learn from losses becomes in-
creasingly pronounced in old age. Note, however, that a recent meta-analysis by Mata 
et al. [2011] showed that, in general, older adults seem to profit less from feedback in 
repeated decisions. The authors interpret this finding as reflecting age-related cogni-
tive changes that make learning more difficult for older compared to younger adults.
 A number of studies that investigated asymmetries in the processing of gains 
and losses in decision making employed the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) [Baena, Al-
len, Kaut, & Hall, 2010; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Denburg, 
Bechara, Tranel, Hindes, & Damasio, 1999; Denburg et al., 2007; Denburg, Recknor, 
Bechara, & Tranel, 2006; Denburg, Tranel, & Bechara, 2005; Kovalchik, Camerer, 
Grether, Plott, & Allman, 2005; MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002; Wood, 
Busemeyer, Koling, Cox, & Davis, 2005]. The results of this line of studies present a 
mixed picture. The IGT requires participants to draw cards consecutively from dif-
ferent decks that correspond to different monetary losses and gains. The correspon-
dence of decks to gains and losses is unknown to the participants. There are 4 decks, 
2 of the decks with high payouts but even higher losses, and 2 decks with low payouts 
but also lower losses. The aim of the task is to win as much money as possible by 
making advantageous card selections. Selections from the low-gain/low-loss decks 
produce a net gain across trials, whereas selections from the high-gain/high-loss 
decks produce a net loss across trials. Participants ideally develop a bias towards the 
advantageous decks resulting in a net gain across trials. Less advantageous decisions 
in the task favor larger versus smaller rewards, despite the large losses associated with 
the same deck and thus long-term negative consequences. The trials are divided into 
blocks, which allows comparing the proportion of advantageous selections across 
blocks as an indicator of learning. Denburg et al. [1999] tested a population of healthy 
older adults with the IGT and found that older adults did not demonstrate a shift over 
time from the decks that produce a net loss to the decks that produce a net gain. Fein, 
McGillivray and Finn [2007] replicated the finding that older adults choose less ad-
vantageously compared to young adults and showed a positive association of older 
adults’ performance with immediate memory. As pointed out by Mata et al. [2011], 
this might be due to decreased learning from feedback in older adulthood. In other 
studies, Denburg et al. [2005, 2006, 2007, 2009] found that performance on the IGT 
might be impaired in a subset of older adults. Furthermore, Denburg et al. [2006] 
administered the IGT and measured psychophysiological correlates of decision mak-
ing (anticipatory skin conductance responses that participants produced immedi-
ately prior to the response) in a sample of elderly participants. Older adults with 
nonimpaired decision making on the IGT showed a stronger physiological response 
to anticipated gains than to anticipated losses. In contrast, younger adults responded 
more strongly to anticipated losses than gains. Older adults with impaired decision 
making on the IGT did not demonstrate discriminatory anticipatory skin conduc-
tance responses for advantageous versus disadvantageous choices. Thus, learning 
from feedback in repeated decision-making tasks seems to be associated with (and 
may even depend on) an intact discriminatory response to gains and losses. Where-
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as these findings seem to suggest that younger adults learn more from loss-related 
feedback over time than older adults, other studies could not replicate these findings. 
For instance, several studies found no significant age-related differences in IGT per-
formance [Baena et al., 2010; Lamar & Resnick, 2004; MacPherson et al., 2002]. Sim-
ilarly, Kovalchik et al. [2005] showed that older adults shifted to the gain payoff decks 
just like younger adults did. The analyses of the IGT by Wood et al. [2005] showed 
that older adults’ strategies differed in several ways: older adults exhibited larger re-
cency effects and faster forgetting of previous outcomes. Furthermore, older adults 
placed equal emphasis on gains and losses whereas younger adults placed greater 
weight on losses. Importantly, older adults showed symmetrical weighting of gains 
and losses that contrasted to the ‘negativity effect’ reflected in the responses of young 
adults, who were greatly influenced by losses. This symmetrical weighting of gains 
and losses has been interpreted as an accurate representation of gains and losses [Pe-
ters & Bruine de Bruin, 2011].
 The majority of these findings suggest unimpaired performance on the IGT in 
older adults in that they shift to advantageous decks across trials. However, as the 
analyses by Wood et al. [2005] suggest, unimpaired performance on the IGT can be 
a result of different strategies. The task was originally developed to capture the inte-
gration of emotion and cognition in decision making [Bechara et al., 1994]. The task 
comprises a variety of features such as weighing risks and benefits, making decisions 
under uncertainty and dealing with unknown outcomes [Denburg et al., 2009]. Al-
though the task requires dealing with gains and losses, unfortunately, it does not as-
sess the sensitivity to gains and losses. In fact, there has been some criticism in the 
literature that it is unclear what the IGT actually measures. For instance, Frank and 
Kong [2008] suggest that the IGT might be sensitive to age-related decline in work-
ing memory. More precisely, trial-to-trial behavior on the IGT might reflect sensitiv-
ity to the recency of positive and negative outcomes, which may depend more on 
working memory than on learning. Another problem with interpreting decision be-
havior on the IGT as reflecting sensitivity towards gains and losses is that it might 
tap more into risk attitudes (risk aversion and risk seeking), as the probabilities of 
gains and losses vary in the task. In a meta-analysis on risk preferences, Mata et al. 
[2011] showed that in decisions from experience (as, for instance, required by the 
IGT) age-related differences in risk-taking were driven by decreased learning in old-
er adults. Older adults act more risk averse compared to young adults, when learning 
led to risk-seeking behavior. In contrast, older adults were more risk seeking com-
pared to younger adults when learning resulted in risk avoidance [Mata et al., 2011]. 
Age-related difference in the performance on the IGT (and potentially also on other 
experience-based decision tasks) might partly depend on an age-related decrease in 
learning. If learning is a necessary process for performance on the IGT, it is unlikely 
that motivational effects modulate age-related differences. Put differently, age-relat-
ed difference in motivation might not have a chance to influence performance on the 
IGT if older adults have more problems learning the risk contingencies. Therefore, 
in tasks such as the IGT or other decision tasks involving learning, we do not expect 
age-related differences in motivation to play an important role for risk aversiveness. 
More generally, the monetary incentives could lead to systematic differences be-
tween age groups. This might be the case because monthly income as well as the 
general importance of money may differ (as will be discussed below in more detail). 
In addition, people do not appear to exhibit loss aversion for small amounts of mon-
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ey. On the contrary, people expect small gains to be more pleasant than they expect 
small losses to be unpleasant [Harinck, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Mersmann, 2007]. 
Hence, the reward structure in the IGT may not be suitable to measure loss aversion 
or single out the impact gains and losses have on task performance. 
 Another set of studies that investigated the asymmetries of gains and losses in 
old age employed the monetary incentive delay task (MID task) [Knutson, Adams, 
Fong, & Hommer, 2001]. In each MID task trial, participants view 1 of 6 different 
cues displaying the amount of money that can be gained or lost on that trial (antici-
pation phase). If the participant responds quickly enough to a subsequent target, he 
or she either gains money or avoids losing money (outcome phase). Importantly, this 
task does not require a decision. However, the task allows distinguishing between the 
anticipation of gains versus losses. Using the MID task, Nielsen, Knutson and 
Carstensen [2008] found that older adults showed less increase in arousal when an-
ticipating a loss compared to a gain, whereas younger adults showed increased nega-
tive arousal during loss anticipation and positive arousal during gain anticipation. 
Moreover, older adults showed less relief compared to young adults when a loss did 
not occur even if it was expected. The authors concluded that these findings support 
the hypothesis that older adults experience less negative emotions than young adults 
and that they may better predict dynamic changes in affect. Yet, as mentioned above, 
in the case of small monetary gains and losses, loss aversion reverses such that people 
expect small monetary gains to be more pleasant than they expect small losses to be 
unpleasant [Harinck et al., 2007]. Given this finding, the results presented for older 
adults are not surprising with respect to the size of the monetary gains and losses 
employed in the study. The highest gain or loss was USD 5, which can be considered 
small in terms of Harinck’s findings [Nielsen et al., 2008]. The finding that older 
adults reported increased positive arousal on trials involving gain anticipation but 
no increase in negative arousal on trials involving loss anticipation might be due to 
the small magnitude of expected losses. In contrast, younger adults show increased 
negative arousal during loss anticipation and increased positive arousal during gain 
anticipation. In this case, the authors acknowledge that older adults seem better in 
affective forecasting. Note also that this study used monetary incentives, which 
might be stronger for younger as compared to older adults [Freund & Blanchard-
Fields, 2011]. Thus, in our view, the results of the study by Nielsen et al. [2008] do not 
allow us to conclude that older adults show a general tendency to experience less 
negative affect when anticipating loss. In fact, it seems more deserving of an expla-
nation why younger adults  failed to discount the small losses. One potential explana-
tion could be that accumulated experience with losses has taught older adults to an-
ticipate that small losses will not be very painful, thereby reducing an affective fore-
casting error. 3 
 In another study, the MID task was used in event-related functional magnetic 
resonance imaging [Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007]. Results suggest similar patterns of 
 3    Loss aversion has been argued to be an affective forecasting error in that people overestimate the 
hedonic impact of losses because they underestimate their tendency to rationalize losses and overesti-
mate their tendency to dwell on losses [Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006]. This argument 
is based on findings from a gambling task. It may be that the smaller forecasting error (‘forecasting ex-
pertise’) older adults showed in the study by Nielsen et al. [2008] for small monetary gains expands to 
other kinds of gains as losses (larger gains and losses, nonmonetary gains and losses).
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neural activation in young and older adults during anticipation of gains (increased 
ventral striatal activation in both groups) but not of losses (increased insular and 
medial caudate activation in younger, but not in older participants). Importantly, the 
observed differences between younger and older adults pertained to the  anticipation 
of losses. There were no differences in response to the negative outcomes themselves. 
Samanez-Larkin et al. [2007] concluded that these findings present an asymmetry in 
the processing of gains and losses in older compared to young adults. They argue that 
this difference is important in decision making. However, the MID task does not 
comprise decisions. Therefore, only conclusions can be drawn about how age groups 
process and anticipate certain outcomes. Seen in this light, the findings of these two 
MID studies support the notion that older adults expect to experience losses, where-
as younger adults expect to experience gains [Heckhausen et al., 1989]. Currently, we 
can only speculate about how anticipated outcomes and the subjective anticipated 
pleasure or pain affects actual decision making. In the MID task, participants con-
trol the outcomes by reacting as fast as possible. As reaction times decrease with age, 
older adults might have experienced less control over the outcomes in the presented 
studies. As a consequence, older adults might expect losses in loss trials and no win 
in gain trials. This, in turn, might result in differences between older and young 
adults in subjectively experienced pleasure, as the standards of comparison are dif-
ferent for older and young adults (see above) [Mellers, 2000]. This might be particu-
larly important when people have to make a decision. In fact, it would be very inter-
esting to employ MID task that requires a decision when investigating adult age dif-
ferences in gain and loss sensitivity for the decision-making process. 
 In a study on risky decision making employing the cups task [Levin & Hart, 
2003], Weller, Levin and Denburg [2010] showed that age-related differences in risky 
decision making occurred depending on whether the expected outcome constituted 
a gain or a loss. In the cups task, there are distinct trials in which the participants 
can either achieve small monetary gains or avoid small monetary losses. Unlike the 
IGT, the cups task does not involve mixed outcomes of gains and losses. Results show 
that younger and older adults’ willingness to take a risk did not differ in the loss tri-
als. Yet, older adults were less willing to take a risk in the gain trials [Weller et al., 
2010]. Older adults, then, may be less willing to accept a potential loss (not winning) 
when they can prevent it. When facing a loss, however, and taking a risk becomes the 
only means to avoid the loss, younger and older adults do not differ in their perfor-
mance on the task.
 In another study on risky decision making, Mikels and Reed [2009] developed 
a new monetary incentive task in which young and older adults chose between sure 
options and risky gambles. The authors showed that positively framed options ap-
pear to have an equal impact on older and younger individuals but that negatively 
framed options lead to a greater willingness to take a risk in older adults [Mikels & 
Reed, 2009]. This result contrasts the findings of Weller et al. [2010] leading to a 
mixed picture regarding risky decision making in old age. Again, one could argue 
that, although the decisions are personal and nonhypothetical, monetary incentives 
might not be equally important to both age groups. Additionally, the gambles entail 
different probabilities for both gains and losses within one option, which might 
make the task difficult to understand for participants [for a discussion of the diffi-
culties in understanding probabilities, see Gigerenzer, 1997; Cosmides & Tooby, 
1996].
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 In conclusion, findings on age-related differences in the asymmetry of the im-
pact of gains and losses on decision making are inconsistent [see also Mata et al., 
2011]. Frequently, symmetries in the processing of gains and losses in older adults are 
contrasted to an emphasis on losses in younger adults and interpreted as a positivity 
bias in older adulthood. Clearly, more research is needed to understand the poten-
tially changing relative impact of gains and losses on decision making across adult-
hood. The methodological shortcomings in the studies reviewed above need to be 
addressed in future studies before a conclusion can be drawn. More specifically, the 
tasks used in these studies should require decisions, monetary incentives should be 
large enough to detect the ‘losses loom larger’ effect, and performance on the task 
should not be bound to reaction times, which are well known to decrease in older 
adulthood [e.g., Li et al., 2004]. As we will point out in the following section, it might 
be useful to employ nonmonetary incentives when studying aging and decision mak-
ing. Finally, if the decision makers’ goals influence decision making as situational 
factors, these may result in a variation of the sensitivity to losses across different de-
cision domains.
 Key Issues for Future Research 
 To date, the empirical basis is insufficient to allow well-grounded conclusions 
about the way motivational development in aging influences decision making. How-
ever, the implications of motivational changes may be relevant to understanding the 
aging decision maker and may also help to explain current inconsistencies in re-
search on decision making and aging. Understanding the aging decision maker can 
provide insight into how to improve communication efforts about issues such as ad-
vance care planning, medical treatment, or housing options. 
 In addition to the methodological suggestions above, several issues need to be 
addressed in future research: the kinds of incentives employed in experimental stud-
ies on decision making (monetary vs. nonmonetary incentives), the comparison of 
decision making in different life domains, and the dynamics across different phases 
in decision making.
 Monetary and Nonmonetary Incentives 
 Most of the studies reported above investigated decision making in tasks with 
monetary gains and losses. However, money might not be equally important to 
young and older adults [Mata et al., 2011]. In fact, a study by Freund and Blan chard-
Fields [2011] suggests that there might be age-related change in the incentive value 
of money. When facing a trade-off between the maximization of one’s personal 
monetary outcome and the protection of the environment, older adults were more 
environmentally minded at the cost of actual monetary payment, whereas the op-
posite pattern was true for younger adults. Moreover, older adults were more will-
ing to donate money they had earned for participation in an experiment to a good 
cause instead of keeping it for themselves. Obviously, an important advantage of 
monetary incentives is that gains and losses can be easily experimentally manipu-
lated and balanced in magnitude of absolute value. In contrast, it is very difficult to 
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balance the magnitudes of gains and losses in nonmonetary incentives. However, 
when investigating the relative impact of gains and losses, it is crucial to establish 
an equivalence of the intensity of gains and losses in order to rule out an intensity 
effect [Peeters & Czapinski, 1990]. When comparing age groups, balancing the in-
tensities of stimuli becomes even more complex. Findings by Keil and Freund 
[2009] show that high emotional arousal was experienced as negative by older 
adults, regardless of whether the stimulus was positive or negative. In contrast, 
younger adults showed a clear pattern of rating more arousing positive stimuli 
more positively. If arousal becomes aversive in older adults, they might weigh cer-
tain outcomes differently than younger adults do regardless of the valence of the 
outcome. Thus, potential age differences in stimulus evaluation need to be taken 
into account. Stimulus materials should ideally be rated on both valence and arous-
al dimensions. 
 Domain-Related Differences 
 In evaluating options, decision makers may place different emphasis on either 
gains or losses depending on the domain (e.g., what the decision is about), such as 
finance, health or social relationships. Developmental expectations regarding gains 
and losses in different domains may underlie such domain-related differences [Mus-
tafic & Freund, 2011]. Thus, the sensitivity to and weighing of gains and losses does 
not represent a domain-general trait but rather the interaction between the situation 
(e.g., availability of resources) and the decision maker (e.g., gain or loss orientation) 
[Figner & Weber, 2011; Yechiam & Ert, 2011]. Accordingly, the investigation of dif-
ferent decision domains that systematically vary along dimensions, such as the avail-
ability of resources, seems particularly interesting for further understanding under 
what conditions people are more likely to show loss aversion. Moreover, from a de-
velopmental perspective, some life domains grow increasingly important across 
adulthood while other domains may lose their importance. For example, social rela-
tionships become increasingly important in old age [Lang & Carstensen, 1994]. 
Moreover, research in the context of socioemotional selectivity theory has shown 
that the quality and satisfaction with social relations do not decline across adulthood 
but might even show gains [Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999]. This might 
also be reflected in older adults’ goal orientation, which might vary by life domain. 
Regarding social relations, younger and older adults might not differ regarding the 
importance they place on growth, maintenance, and the prevention of loss [Carsten-
sen et al., 1999]. This might also affect the impact of gains and losses for decision 
making.
 In contrast, physical functioning and health are subject to age-related decline 
[Baltes & Smith, 2003], which is also reflected in people’s developmental expecta-
tions [Mustafic & Freund, 2011]. In these life domains, older adults might be par-
ticularly sensitive to losses and might show stronger loss aversion than younger 
adults. Improvement in communicating information about important health-relat-
ed decisions may foster successful advance care planning for potential future health 
issues such as dementia. Hence, understanding how older adults perceive and pro-
cess information in different domains may help to accomplish this. In sum, future 
studies should compare the sensitivity to losses in domains in which normative de-
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velopmental losses are expected (such as declining health and cognitive function-
ing) and in domains that are not subject to developmental losses (such as social re-
lationships).
 Dynamics across the Decision-Making Process 
 As indicated above, age-related shifts in goal orientation may vary across life 
domains. Thus, older adults may flexibly shift between different decision-making 
strategies in different domains and contexts, such as description-based or experi-
ence-based decision tasks. In addition, decision makers may flexibly shift between 
different information-processing strategies and evaluations of the situation in differ-
ent phases of the decision-making process. This may resolve some apparent contra-
dictions in findings on older adults’ processing of gains and losses in decision mak-
ing. For example, an emphasis on losses when trying to prevent a loss seems most 
adaptive in the predecisional phases. This could change for postdecisional settings 
when the decision maker has no further control over the outcome. In this phase, fo-
cusing on negative or loss-related information has adaptive value only for future de-
cisions, but can no longer affect the past. In repeated decision situations, then, learn-
ing from bad choices is possible. This reasoning is in line with the finding that older 
adults learn more from negative information in a reward-learning setting in which 
choices are repeated [Frank & Kong, 2008], but demonstrate a postdecisional positiv-
ity bias when this is not the case [Kim, Healey, Goldstein, Hasher, & Wiprzycka, 
2008; Mather & Johnson, 2000]. As elaborated in the context of the IGT, when learn-
ing is involved in repeated decisions, older adults might profit less from feedback 
regarding past choices. In experience-based repeated decisions, the decision maker 
has to learn the value of options from experience when deciding between risky op-
tions. Given the age-related decrease in learning, age-related differences might re-
flect primarily decreased learning abilities rather than motivational changes [Mata 
et al., 2011]. Future studies are needed to dissociate age-related differences in moti-
vation and learning differences in description-based repeated choices. 
 In conclusion, older adults may not only flexibly adjust their strategies across 
but also within situations, depending on perceived control and adaptive value of 
asymmetric evaluations of gains and losses. In our view, this area of research might 
be particularly fruitful for understanding aging and decision making. In order to 
address these ideas, future research needs to rely on such methods as process tracing 
(e.g., using a ‘mouse lab’ procedure) that allow to investigate information seeking 
behavior in different phases of the decision-making process and accompanying emo-
tional responses (e.g., through the measurement of skin conductance responses) 
[Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kühberger, & Ranyard, 2011]. A process-tracing approach 
can also help to clarify which underlying processes may be influenced by loss preven-
tion. Based on the motivational literature and the impact of goals on information 
processing, we assume that attention and memory are particularly likely to be af-
fected by goal orientation towards gains or losses [e.g., Van Lange, Kruglanski, & 
Higgins, 2011]. One important question in this regard concerns the process of infor-
mation integration: how do younger and older adults integrate different aspects of 
information into a representation of the decision options? Do younger adults over-
represent gain-related information whereas older adults overrepresent loss-related 
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information? This question could be empirically addressed using think-aloud pro-
cedures during the decision-making process. Another approach to dissociate differ-
ent processes in the decision-making process and their integration is offered by the 
elaboration of computational models. To our knowledge, there do not exist any mod-
els addressing the interplay of motivation and cognition in explaining age-related 
differences in the decision-making process.
 Applied Consequences 
 Older adults frequently need to make informed choices about important issues 
such as health care, medical treatment, insurance, financial plans, advance care 
planning, and housing. However, informed decision making is a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, it allows people to be autonomous and to make their own 
decisions regarding these important issues according to their own preferences. In 
favor of informed choice, some researchers argue that older adults can make advan-
tageous decisions when complete information is available to them [Zamarian, Sinz, 
Bonatto, Gamboz, & Delazer, 2008]. On the other hand, this autonomy may also 
place a burden on decision makers as they are confronted with a vast amount of in-
formation and complex choice settings. As shown by Schwartz [2004], there might 
be something akin to a ‘tyranny of choice,’ in that having more options available 
leads to dissatisfaction with one’s choice. Moreover, even if all information about all 
options is available, people are typically unable to process all of the information, 
which makes making optimal decisions on the basis of this information impossible 
[Simon, 1982]. This might be particularly true in old age when cognitive resources 
are even more limited than at younger ages [Mata, 2007; Mata et al., 2007]. Here, mo-
tivational factors might be particularly important for the selection of information. 
Thus, understanding the motivational factors influencing decision making in older 
adults can help to improve communication about options in areas such as advance 
care planning, medical treatment, and housing options. More specifically, an in-
creasing motivation to prevent losses may lead to changes in decision-making strat-
egies, information search, and processing. Hence, communication about choice al-
ternatives should be adjusted accordingly in order to enhance the effectiveness of 
communication. Consequently, the information presented could be reduced by mak-
ing information that is particularly important to the decision maker’s goals salient, 
for example, information that is diagnostic for counteracting losses and the mainte-
nance of a current state. The potential to counteract losses or maintain some level of 
functioning should be emphasized more strongly if the prevention of loss is a central 
goal for the decision maker. Hence, alternatives should be evaluated and communi-
cated with respect to their potential to counteract losses. Furthermore, pointing out 
potential gains and benefits of options may be inefficient and suited more for com-
municating with younger adults. Additionally, understanding how older adults re-
view and process information may lead to implications about how older adults should 
be instructed to approach choice situations. For instance, Löckenhoff and Carstensen 
[2007] showed that older adults reviewed more positive information on health care 
plans when asked to focus on their emotions and less positive information when in-
structed to focus on specific facts and details. Thus, instructing older adults to focus 
on facts may eliminate differences between older and younger adults.
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 Conclusion 
 In this article, we have argued that motivational shifts in goal orientation to-
wards gains and losses might be important for understanding older adults’ decision 
making. We propose that decision making might change across adulthood towards 
more vigilant and conservative decision-making strategies aimed at preventing loss-
es. As of yet, the vast literature on loss aversion in decision making has not yet in-
cluded a lifespan perspective. Findings available to date present a mixed picture of 
results. We posit that losses loom even larger in older adulthood, a time at which the 
motivation to prevent losses increases. Older adults might be more sensitive to po-
tential losses than younger adults. This might have important applied implications 
for the presentation of information in complex decision contexts for older adults such 
as health care or financial planning.
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